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The Growing Significance of the Federal Debt 
In a little less than a half century the federal debt 
has gro'Wll from an item of' little significance, to one of con-
siderable importance., This growth has taken the form of an 
increase in absolute amount as well as a more complex com--
position. 
Figure 1 is presented to aid in the realization of the 
absolute size growth pattern. Starting with the year 1916, 
the total gross debt amounted to one billion dollars. 1 While 
this was not an all-time low, the relative concern of the 
Secretary of the Treasury in regard to this amount is re-
flected by his very casual and brief mention of the debt in 
the Secretary's statement published in the Annual Report for 
that year.2 The expenditures of World War One brought a 
sharp, if temporary, increase in the total debt to a new 
balance of $26 billion on December 31, 1919.3 From this 
lu. s. Treasury, Annual Re12ort, 12.22. (Washington, 1957), 
Po 22. 
2u. s. Treasury, Annual Re12ort, 1916 (Washington, 1917), 
p. 184. 
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* Excludes Victory Loan proceeds used to repay 
debt in 1946. 
Figure 1. The growth of the federal debt during 
four decades.. All yearly debt totals are 
for December 31 except as follows: 
1949, April 30; 1956, June 30. 
Source: u. ·s. Treasury, Annual Report, 
1956 (Washington, 1957), p. 22. 
peak the debt entered an eleven year period of gradual de-
crease reaching a low of $16 billion at the end of calendar 
year 1930. ~he eleven year period leading to t~e trough was 
followed by a similar period, in the sense of length of time 
and relatively gradual rate of change. On December 31, 1939, 
the debt stood at $47.5 billion representing:,the increased 
government expenditures designed to inflate the economy. 
The next seven years were witness to a very sharp increase 
in the debt resulting from the efforts to-finance World War 
3 
Two. At the cipse •r the war, the total gr~ss debt stood 
at $259.5 billi~n o~ December 31, 1946. From this new p~ak 
the debt d&crea$ed slightly to the amount o~ $2;1.; billion 
on April 30, 1~9.>+ From this point. the.de~t.followed a 
general ujward ,trend to today's (June 30,19;6) debt total 
of $273 billio~.; 
! 
Thus in a period of thirty-nine and a ~alf years there 
' 
has been a net incr·ease of approximately $272 billion, many 
times :its size in 1916,, Convincing arguments deflating this 
increase can be made on the bas:Jis of pric:e indexes, and in-
creases in population or national inQQme.! The validity or 
these arguments is not challenged. the point presented_ 
,j• 
here, and s~bstantiated by the preceding data, is s:1.mpl)' 
' ! !• . 
that the sheer absolute size of the public debt has been 
I • 0. 
. ·~ . \ ~ 
sub~ect to very r~pid growt:t;i in the past tour decades. 
As stated above, this growth in dollar amounts has been 
accompanied by an increase in the complexity. of the com.po- < 
sition or the debt. On page thirty-six.of the Treasurer's 
·AJmual Report for fiscal 1916, the federal interest-bearing 
debt is itemized by security class. This listing consists 
or eight entries.6 A similar listing appearing in the 
4Ibid., p. 393. This date is not cited because it is 
the. exact low point but because it immediately precedes the 
Accord between the :federal Reserve Bank and the u. :S. Trea-
sury which was published in March, 19;1. This Accord will 
be thoroughly considered later in this ·report. 
'Ibid,,, p. 22. 
6u. --s. Treasury, j.nnual Report, 1916, P• 36. 
Annual Report for fiscal 1956 consists of twenty-three 
items.7 
As the amount which the Treasurer is compelled to ob-
tain continually increases, the more consideration he is 
compelled to give to the purchasers of government securi-
ties. This tailoring of funding and refunding operations 
may take the form of a greater variety of maturities, ex-
change privileges and variations in the rate of interest. 
In other words, the Treasurer must devise securities so 
as to fully·utilize not only the potential of the ovm.er-
ship classes presently purchasing the securities, but also 
4 
to induce new owner classes to place their money in govern-
ment securities. An example would be the savings bonds 
which were authorized by Congress in 1935 in response to 
request by Secretary Morgenthau.8 This bond offered two 
advantages: 1) It is a registered bond, i.e.--it will be 
replaced if lost .. 2) It may be redeemed at any time after 
sixty days at par plus a predetermined return. Thus it 
provided a high degree of security for the "average citizen° 
who does not have the ability to protect himself against 
capital losses which may result from price changes in the 
open market. This example is only one of several which were 
to follow. Iri reference to the World War Two defense period, 
7u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 1.2.2£, p. 398. 
8u. So Treasury, Annual Report, 1232 (Washington, 1936), 
PP• 18, 23-25. 
't 
the chief of the International Monetary Fund's Financial Divi-
sion of the Research Department stated, "During the defense 
period the Treasury made sweeping changes in its borrowing 
t hn. n9 ec . iques •••• 
While the market may exert the greatest influence on 
the Treasurer's debt management, his decisions are somewhat 
handicapped by rather arbitrary legislative requirements·'~ 
\ ' 
These include ~aximum limits on the debt which the Treasurer 
may incur and on the interest rate which he may offer.lo 
Two primary factors, growth in absolute \dollars and 
inerease in complexity of c6hiposi tion, have:·,pr.·ov=i'ded ·:the/.Ame!·-
ican economy with a debt which has continually become more 
difficult to manage. This is the situation irrespective of 
the manager's specific goals. 
Intention of this Study 
The intention of this study is three-fold. First 1 the 
reader will be provided with statistical elements of the 
federal debt for a time period consisting of·five fiscal 
years, 1952 through 1956. Second, this data will be examined 
in respect to its effects on the American economy. These 
effects will include the probable as well as the evident. 
9Henry c. Murphy, .ll}& National Debt in War .fill.d Tran• 
sition (New York, 1950), p. 31. 
lOcommittee for Economic Development, Managing the 
Federal ~ (New York, 195'4), p. 5. · 
6 
Last, in conclusion of this inquiry, a summary of debt man-
agement over the entire five year period, including recog-
nition of pertinent trends, will be pr·ovided. Following this 
summary, appropriate conclusions will be furnished • 
• 
CHA,PTER II 
DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE 
The preceding chapter stated that the United States 
federal debt has grown in size as well as complexity of 
composition. The intention of this study was identified 
as the examination and determination of the economic ef-
fects of the debt management. Before launching into the 
economic analysis, the next few pages will be devoted to 
defining th~ basic terminology and to clarifying the de-
signed scope of this study. 
Definition of Basic Terminology 
Throughout this thesis frequent reference will be made 
to the Federal Reserve Banking System and to the United 
States Treasury Department. Since both designations are 
long and rather clumsy to use repeatedly, shorter desig-
nations will be used. The term Federal Reserve will dei,.ote 
the Federal Reserve Banking System. The word Treasury or 
Treasurer, when capitalized, will signify the United States 
Treasury Department or the Secretary of this department, 
respectively. 
In the introduction, the terms federal debt and debt 
management were used without qualification or explanation. 
7 
The objective here is to present the connotations of these 
terms which are peculiar to this study. 
The first term to be considered is the term: debt. 
8 
When a debt becomes as large as that of the Federal Govern-
ment's, it is represented by many different instruments. It 
is convenient to arrange this variety of instruments into 
various groups and identify them accordingly. Table I has 
been prepared to illustrate the composition of the classifi-
cations. 
In this study, emphasis will be placed on the most 
volatile portion of the debt, the marketable issues which 
comprise approximately fifty-eight percent of the total 
gross public debt and guaranteed obligatiops. Consideration 
will also be given to the nonmarketable issues comprising 
twenty-five percent, and to the nonpublic special issues 
which total sixteen percent, of the total gross public debt 
and guaranteed obligations. The words 11nonmarketable sector" 
or "nonmarketables'', as used in the following chapters, will 
be construed to include the special issues. 
In work of this type it is common to use the fiscal 
year rather than the calendar year. This is the accounting 
period utilized by the Treasury; the Federal Reserve uses 
the calendar year. While actual analysis in this report 
will be based on a fiscal year basis, it will be necessary 
to utilize the calendar year in certain instances in order 
to facilitate information obtained from the Federal Reserve's 
publications. This thesis will follow the established usage 
TABLE I 
COMPOSITION OF DEBT CLASSIFICATIONS AND CHARfCTERISTICS 
OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS, FISCAL 195'4 
DelS~-Classifications Maturity Interest Amount'+ 
and Instruments2 - (yearsL Jnercent )~ (billions,, 
Treasury. BILLS --~,--~, - ---c-------r,y--·--- - cf;134- - -----.-~19~-, 
CERTIFICATES of indebtedness one or less 1.92i 18.4 
Treasurr NOTES l to 5 l.838 32.0 
Treasury BONDS (6) 2.440 ~
Total marketable 2.()1+3 $  
U.S. SAVINGS BONDS (7) 2.793 5.1 
U.S. S~VINGS NOTES 2 or 3 · 2.377 58.l 
INVESTMENT SERIES BONDS 18·or 29 (9) 12.8 
Depository bonds- - 12 (9) e.4 
Total nonmarketable 2.751 $ 76.3 
Total public issues (9) $ 226.7 
SPECIAL ISSUES (8) 2.671 1+2.2 
Total interest-bearing 2.342 $ 268.9 
Matured debt-on which interest 
has ceased 
Debt bearing no interest 
Total gross public debt 
Total guaranteed 
Total gross public debt and 








$ 271.3 '° 
TABLE I (Continued) 
IFiscal 1954 was chosen merely as an example year. 
~Words typed in capital letters designate sh. ort titles. 
~Computed annual interest charge or interest rate. 
Items may not add to totals due to rounding error. 
5May be issued for any period of one year or less, but generally issued for 
a perigd of approximately three months. . . 
17Used for long-term borrowing, though may be issued for any period. 
<Ranges from 9 years and 8 months to 20 years. 
Bvaries with particular issue. Generally, they carry no specific maturity 
date, but may be redeemed on demand after one year. 
~Indicates data not available or not applicable. 
Sources: u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 1.2..2!:t (Washington, 1955), pp. 471, 
485-489, 566. Federa~ Reserve Bank of New York, The Treasury ,fil1g the Hgney Market 
(New York, 1954), pp .. 18-20, 24 .• 
I-' 
0 
of' letting all reference to years mean the dalendar year 
except those specifically designated as fiscal years. 
The remaining term to be clarified is debt management. 
A comprehensive definition is provided by Charles c. Abbott 
in the initial pages of his book' on debt management. His 
definition is: 
By management of the debt is meant the choice of 
debt forms and the proportionate amounts of the 
different types used, the selection of the pattern 
of debt maturities, the amounts of debt placed 
with different classes of holders, the decisions 
to repay or refund maturing obligations, the re-
funding terms offered, the treatment given differ-
ent classes of debt and different types of bond-
holders, determination of the provisions attached 
to new bond issues, adaptation of new issues to 
the needs of.prospective holders, policies pursued 
in the retirement or creation of new debt, and 
relative weights given to all these1matters in the 
government's general fiscal policy. 
It is apparent that these two words take on special meaning 
when combined to designate care of the federal de·bt. At 
risk of loss of completeness, a shorter, more limited defi-
nition may be desirable in this case .. Such a one is pro-
vided by Leon E. Krouse who describes debt management as: 
Debt management means making financial decisions as 
to the kind of securities to be used and their spe-
cial features; the maturity and other terms of range 
of the debt; and ownership pattern of the debt--all 
of which are condit;oned by economic implications, 
present and future. 
lcharles c. Abbott, Managemen.:t_ Q!. thE?,. Federal Debt 
(New York, 1946), pp. 1-2. · 
21eon E., Krouse, 11Management of the Federal Debt 11 
(unpub. Ph .. D .. dissertation, New York University, 1958), 
p .. 65 .. 
11 
12 
In general, then debt management is financial decisions which 
are conditioned by economic realities. 
Scope of Study 
Studies in the field of federal debt analysis may be 
directed so as to orient the work around one or more of the 
major facets of debt management. These sectors of analysis 
may be designated in the following manner. 1) The Empirical 
Framework .Q1. ~~which is a historical study of the 
debt's composition over a period of time. 2) Treasury Debt 
Administration which seeks to determine how, and if possible· 
why, the empirical framework was established. This entails 
a study of the various classes of securities issued during 
a given period. At this point, the analysis is similar to 
that which would be accomplished in the first approach. 
However, this approach goes further by endeavoring to learn 
why certain securities were issued. This requires an exami.-
nation of economic forces which may have influenced debt 
management decisions. 3) The Administration .Q1. ~ Debt 
.1u: the Federal Reserve and Its· Interrelationship with the 
Treasury which is concerned, primarily, with the technical 
operations of marketing, funding, refunding, retiring, and 
servicing the debt. 4) The Market for the Debt which endeav-
ors to determine what types of securities are most easily 
absorbed by the capital and money markets, together with 
the reasons why, thus providing guidance for future i-ssues. 
The above limits are rather arbitrarily assigned. By 
13 
no means are they mutually exclusive. This study will em-
ploy the second one as its point of emphasis. The remain-
ing three will be involved in the analysis, but only as they 
facilitate the development of the Treasury's administration 
of the debt. 
This report will be concerned with a .five year period, 
fiscal 1952 through 1956. This period was selected on the 
basis of several considerations. The starting date of 
July 1, 1951, was selected because it marks the beginning 
of the first fiscal year following the Accord Qf. March lli1• 
This accord is a bench mark in debt management history be-
cause at this point the Federal Reserve was relieved of the 
responsibility of supporting the Federal Government's secur-
ities in the open market.3 In addition, debt management 
previous to this date has been thoroug·hly covered by promi-
nent economists, leaving little of major significance to be 
added .. The termination date of June 30, 1956, was chosen 
because essential data following this point is not available 
locally. The last consideration was the belief that this 
period of five years was sufficient to provide enough data 
for an analysis of this nature. 
Stated Basis for Debt Management Policy 
Essential to the next chapter is the intended policy 
3u. s. Congress, Senate Document No. 123, Monetary· 
Policy and~ Management of !b&, Public Debt, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess :---CWashington, 1952;, p. 7Y·. · 
14 
of the Treasury in respect to debt management" The Treasuryns 
~uthority for fiscal action originates from the law which 
~stablished the Treasury in 1789/1- At that time the current 
debt of $75 million evidently was not considered to be of 
sufficient import to warrant specific mention of its manage-
mento5 For this reason 9 later legislation is generally cited., 
During the past decade the Treasury, as well as the Federal 
Reserve~ has considered the ~mployment Act of 1946 as its 
basic policy directiveo6 Before proceeding further, it may 
be helpful to review that purpose of this act as set forth 
. in the preambleo 
The Congress declares that it is the oontinuing 
policy and responsibility of the Federal Government. 
to use all practicable means consistent with its needs 
and obligations and other essential considerations of 
national policy, with the assistance and cooperation 
of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local· 
governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, 
functions·,· and resources for the purpose of creating. 
and maintaining, in a. manner calcula-t;;e·d to foster and 
promot~ free competitive enterprise a.nd the.general 
welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded 
useful employment opportunities, including work and 
to promote maximUinr employmentj production and purchas-
ing powero7 , 
The directive nature of this act is very generalo It 
commits the government and its agencies to improve the 
4Ibid., si Po 2 
5u., So Treasury~ Annual Report~ 1.2,n· (Washington, 1956), 
Po 4030 
6uo So Congress, Senate Document Noo 123, Monetar~ 
Polic:y and the Management Qi:. the Public Debt, pp., 2, 6 lo 
7 15 U. So Ca A. Sec., 10210 
15 
welfare of ~he nation. In other words, it is in favor of 
thi ngs which are good. Policy of a more specific nature 
may be found in statements and speeches made by the Trea-
surer and his assistants. While it would not be pertinent 
to present a comprehensive compilation of the p6licy state-
ments at this point, a few will be cited to exhibit their 
nature. 
On March 10, 1952, Secretary Snyder set forth the 
following as being among the major economic objectives of 
the Treasury~8 
1. To maintain .confidence in the credit of the 
United States Government. 
l+. To direct our debt management programs to-
ward (a) countering any pronounced inflationary or 
deflationary pressures (b) providing securities to 
meet the current needs of various investor groups, 
and (c) maintaining a sound market for United States 
Government securities. 
5. To use debt policy cooperatively with mone-
tary-credit policy to contribute toward healthy 
economic growth and reasonable stability in the val-
ue of the dollar. 
6. To conduct the day-to-day financial opera-
tions of the Treasury so as to avoid disruptive 
effects in the money market and to complement other 
economic programs . / . 
7 • . To hold down the interest cost of the pub-
lic d~bt to the extetit that this is consistent with 
the foregoing objectives. 
A significant point in this statement is paragraph seven in 
that emphasis was placed on economic stability rather than 
a low interest rate. The significance is, of course, in 
Bu. s. C~ngress ,. Subcommittee on General .Credit Control 
and Debt Management of the Joint Committee o~ the Economic 
Report, Monetary Policy and the Mana~ement of the Public 
Debt~ H~arings, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.Washington, 1952), 
pp. IJ-9. -
16 
·the Treasurer's adherence to the policy established by the 
Accord of March, 1.2.21• 
On March 10, 1953, Secretary Humphrey made the following 
statements while appear.ing before the Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations.9 
l. That we pay a little down on our debt .from 
time to time instead of rapidly borrowing more. 
2. That we keep our credit good by properly 
managing the debt we a~ready have. 
Approximately five months later, while speaking at the Gover-
nor's Conference, Seattle, Washington, Secretary Humphrey 
-
confirmed the preceding policy and stressed the importance 
of lengthening the debt. 
The Treasury's mairt role is this business of 
k~eping honest money lies in its handling of the 
public debt. That debt is now over $272 billion1 
and the manner in which refinancing and placement 
of new issues is handled can affect the entire 
Nation's well-being. The Treasury is trying to 
make the debt sounder by gradually extending the 
length of .its maturities·; Now nearly three-quar-
ters of the debt matures within less than five 
years.10 · · 
This is the essence of the nature of published debt 
management policy of the Treasury. As the reader is aware, 
by this time, it is shrouded in generalit ie s . Generalities 
which are often slanted to conform to the biases ·or the 
section of American society t o which the Treasurer happens 
9u. s . Congress , House, Committee on Appropriat iens; 
Treasury~Post Office Department s Appr opriations for 1954, 
Hearings,~ Cong ., 2d Se ss . (Washington, 1953), p.~ 
10u. s. Treasury , Annual Re port, 12.i3. '. (Washington , 
1954), pp~ 244-245. 
to be speaking. This may be a necessity considering. the 
complexity of the debt and the_dynamism of the American 
17, 
.. economy. Th.at is, a well-d~fi:ned polipy ·c?mbined with ~ig'i~ 
~.,., ·.:..,,. 
adhe·rence might be disastrous. To pursue this po'int further 
would .b.e an infringement on the purpose of the J').ext chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS OF DEBT BY FISCAL YEAR 
This chapter can be viewed as the heart of this study. 
It will contain a detailed -examination of debt management 
' .. 
for the period of fiscal 1952 through 1956 with the .object 
of determining the effects of this management on the Amer-
-
ican economy. Before considering the debt as it is, it may 
be beneficial to· con.sider how it reached its present .state. 
History of Debt till July 1, 1951 
For the first one and a quarter centuries, 1790 to 1916, 
the debt amounted to less than one billion dollars, except 
for the Civil War period and a two.year period at the turn 
of the present century. Beginning with World War One, the 
debt started on an inc;rease which was fed by political and 
economic disorder, specifically ·the Great Depression and 
World War Two. At the end of World Wa,r Two, the debt had 
reached a new plateau of $269.9 bill:j.on on June 30, 19l+6, 
from which the variation has never exceeded a few billien 
df?llars or percentag, points of ch~ge.1 Itis interesting 
to note, that while the absolute a.mount of the debt has b113en 




relatively constant since 1946, the Gross Debt Per Capita 
has followed a definite downward trend.2 A look behind the 
absolute size of the debt will reveal some influences, and 
changes in these influences, directing the management of 
the debt. 
Prior to the depression, pub1ic debt was considered to 
be a neces.sary evil associated wi 1h wars. During the depres-
sion, inte:r~st in deficit spendin~ grew rapidly with the · ·. 
change in, economic thought which followed the publishing ~:f 
Keynes I a;,neral 'Theory.3 Thus, at the beginning :Of the de-
' \, 
fense period preceding World War Two, the Am~ricah. econoiny 
possess~d three important characferistics wtiich p~re to be 
influential in shaping the fortrlcoming debt sttJtegy. Tpese 
three characteristics were high unemployment of the nation's 
resources, .very low interest rates and a plentiful supply of 
loanable funds, and a federal debt of relatively sma11 · s1z~.4 
With these factors conducive to debt creation, the Treasury 
was able to borrow fifty-six per cent of the $383 billion 
needed to finance World War Two and maintain the necessary 
cash balance.5 This constituted a marked improvement over 
2 ' Ibid., p. 392. 
3seymour E. Harris,~ Na~ional Debt and the New 
Economics (New York, 1947), p •• 
4Henry c. Murphy, The National Debt in War and Transi-
tion (New York, 1950), p. 7. 
5committee on Public Debt Policy, Our Natiohal Debt 
(New York, 1949), p. 54. 
the seventy~fiV'e per cent which w;as borrowed in World W~r 
One. In· ord~r to a:void inflation.ary pressures, an eff~rt 
; ' 
was made to sell as ·much of the debt as possible to non-
20 
bank investors.6 As'a result the nonbank sector: absorbed· 
thirty-three per ce~t, the Federal Reserve six per ce!}-t, and 
' ' 
the commercial banks seventeen per cent of the total need of 
the Treasury.7 
To induce the commercial banks to enter the government 
. . : 
securities market, special incentives were proyided.· In 
1941, the Fed,eral Reserve issued a statement committing.it-
self ·to advance funds on Government securities at par to 
any -commercial bank.8 As the war continued, a pattern of 
rates--a rate for each type o'f security--was established 
and maintained.by the Feder.al Reserve. While the Treasury 
r.i.oped to keep knowledge of the precise rate from the.,in\fes-
tors, it was able to do so with only limited success.9 The 
situation developed to the·point that government securities 
approached a state of·being interest-bearing money. Both 
instruments, securities:.and money, ·have value becau~e they 
carry the guarantee of the United States Government. The 
characteristics of money ,which the. securities lac.ked, such 
PP• ;~;~iain Withers, 1'he Public Debt (New YOrk, 1945), 
7C:ommi ttee on Public !>ebt Policy, P• 54. 
8Board of Govenors of ·,the Federal· Reserve System, Twenty-
eight Annual Report (Washington, 1941), p. 1. 
~urphy, pp. ~0-103. · " 
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as medium of exchange, could be quickly remedied by present-
ing the securities at any bank for conversion to cash at par. 
Thus some persons felt that ,it was not entirely equitable to 
pay interest on a security which involved no risk of loss 
of value. 
Irrespective of the merits or costs of pegging the in-
terest rate it was considered to be a necessary part of the 
war borrowing program. This program was generally consid-
ered a success on the grounds that it enabled the nation 
to mobilize the necessary resources at low interest rates 
while keeping inflation below World War I and Civil War 
levels, even though these wars employed less resources.10 
This, of course, does not deny the value of other factors 
such as price controls and rationing. 
After the war, a question arose as to whether interest 
rates pegged at low levels were compatible with the American 
economy as it made its transition to peacetime activity. 
Opposing points of view were taken by the Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve. The Treasury felt, as expressed by Under 
Secretary Bell during an address at a meeting of the Associa-
tion of Exchange Firms on November 19, 1945, that continued 
low rates would prove advantageous to all members of American 
s·ociety •11 This view was strengthened by 'Sec:r:etary Snyder I s 
lOibid., p. 287. 
llu. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 1946 (Washington, 1947), 
p. 289. 
22 
opinion that higher interest rates would not serve to dampen 
inflationary pressures.12 The counter-argument was present-
ed by the Federal Reserve who felt that pegging the inter-
est rates stripped them of any control over the commercial 
banking system and therefore made monetary policy futile.13 
Passage of time did not reconcile the disagreement be-
tween the two government agencies. On December 1, 19+9, Mr. 
Eccles, Chairman of the Board of Governors, told a Congres-
sional Subcommittee that the Federal Reserve was no longer 
. 
able to implement the responsibilities delegated to it tt.nder 
the law.14 As the condition continued to grow worse, the 
12u. S. Treasury, Annual Report, l.2.21 (Washington, 1952), 
pp. 266-267. Secretary Snyder's defense contained the fol-
lowing essential poi:nts. The na1;:ion•s primary objecti·t/e. of 
producing military and defense goods necessitated some credit 
expansion. General credit restraint would not be effective · 
due to large volume of liquid <?-ssets througliout the .economy. 
The pent-up demand for goods and services sterning from the 
shortages during World War Two and Korea was the primary 
cause of any current inflation. That a stable government 
securities market . was essential to successful financing of 
the debt. 
13Board of Governors of the Federal Re.serve System, 
Thirty-third Annual Report . (Washington, 1946), pp. 1-8. 
The Federal Reserve•s position was based on the following 
arguments: That pegging the ' interest rate on government 
securities at a low level tended to keep i all intere:st rat~s 
lower than would normally be the case; that commercial banks 
could expand credit at will since government securities could 
be liquidated without loss; the Federal Reserve had to pur-
chase the securities to preserve stability in the market. 
These two factors, low interest rates and expansion of credit, 
prompted increase in spending not matched by increases in 
real output. The result was inflation. 
14u. s. Congress, Subcommittee on Monetary, Credit, and 
Fiscal Policies of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 
Monetary, Credit, and . Fiscal Policies, Hearings, 81st Cong., 
1st Sess. (Washington, 1950), p. 223. 
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nec4ssi ty of, \some sort of definite agreement became ap~,~rent o 
i 
In the forepa~t of 1951, representatives of the two agehcies 
/ 
met to work out a compromiseo This compromise took the form 
of an announcement published jointly on March 4 by the 
Federal Reserve and the Treasury and has since become known 
as the Accord .Q! March~ ~o This agreement reads as follows; 
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have 
reached full accord with respect to.debt-management 
and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering 
their common purpose to assure the succe~sful financ ... 
ing of the Government 8s requirements and, at the sel]Je 
time 9 to tninim,;tze monetization of the public debt('l.L'.J 
The Federal Rsserve Open Market C@mmittee was now free to 
engage in c,ountercyclical monetary controls leaving the Trea-
sury to manage its debt without the support of the Federal 
Reserve i, 
The government securities market began to fall on March 
5 and within two weeks the price on all bank restricted is-
sues had fallen below par., In response to these new market 
conditions~ the Treasury initiated some changes in its debt 
management., An example would be the Investment Series B 
Bonds which were issued during Marcho16 
This brings the summary to the eve of the period to be 
given detailed examination in this study., It is hoped that 
' . 
the preceping has' briefly acquainted the reader with the· 
conditions·which prevailed prior to the beginning of fiscal 
19520 
- l5u., S,, Treasury~ Annual Reports 12.2l~ p., 271., 
16charles Co Abbott? The Federal~ (New York~ 19,3)~ 
po 107.o 
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Debt Management, 1952 
Fiscal 1952 was the first year in which the Treasury 
was compelled to manage the debt by its own wits and without 
the guarantee of the Federal Reserve. Due to the new con-
ditions, the Treasury instituted three principal changes in 
its debt policy. First, it increased the weekly offerings 
of bills. The second phase took the form of reorganization 
of the Savings Bond Program. Effective May 1, 1952, the 
maturity period on all Series E Bonds was shortened from 
ten years to nine years and eight months. In effect this 
raised the yield to three per cent, if held to maturity, and 
provided similar increases in premature yields. In addition, 
these bonds were allowed to earn three per cent, compounded 
semi-annually, for ten years following maturity. A new 
bond, Series H, was placed on the market during the first 
of June. This was a current income bond with interest being 
paid via semi-annual check. The final change in the Savings 
Bond Program consisted of discontinuance of the Series F and 
G Bonds. This series was originally offered in March of 
1951.17 
To facilitate recognition of changes in the debt struc-
ture during this period, Table II has been prepared. A 
brief examination will reveal some significant changes. 
17Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, "Treasury Launches 
Deficit Financing Program," Monthly Review, June, 1952, p. 5 • 
... ! · 
TABLE II 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL SECURITIESl 
BY TYPE OF ISSUE, FISCAL 1952 
(In billions of dollars) 
Changes accounted for bi--
Type of Security Total Private Government Banks 
Changes non bank investment Commercial Federal 
Investors accounts Reserve 
Marketable: 
Bills 3.6 1.4 * 2.3 -0.1 Certificates 18.9 5.6 * 4.6 8.6 Notes -16.8 -6.3 * -3.7 -6.9 Bonds - .3.2 -2.z -0.3 -0.* o. 
otal 2.5' -1.9 -0 • 2 --------- 2 • 1. 
onmarKe"tao1.e, e"tc .• : 
Savings Bonds 0.1 0.1 * * 
Savings Notes -1.2 -1.1 * -0.1 
Special Issues 3.1 -- 3.1 
Investment Series 
Bonds -0.5 1.0 0.5 * -2.0 
Other -0.1 -0.2 -- 0.1 
Total l._4 -0.2 ~-6-~ _ ! ______ -2.0 
Total Change - - - 3.9 - -- -- -2.2 --- -- -- 3.4- -- 2-~13 -0.1 
1Gross public debt, and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside the Treasury. 
*Less than $50 million. 




The total debt increased by $3.9 billion. This change 
was accounted for by an increase in the short-term issues 
with a corresponding decrease in .the long-term issues. This 
shift is prevalent in the commercial bank, Federal Reserve 
and private nonbank investor classes. This shift to the 
short end is in ag:reemeht with the eleven month decline in 
the average length of the debt as recorded in Table III. In 
addition, there was a transfer of debt from the nonmarketable 
to the marketable sector. The only exception is government 
investment accounts. These changes are a matter of fact. 
The next few paragraphs will discuss their causes and effects. 
Most easily explained are the changes in the government 
'investment accounts. Of the total absolute change, seventy-
nine per cent was in special issues. Approximately two-
thirds of the special issues were absorbed by the federal 
old-age and survivors insurance trust fund. Significant 
amounts were also sold to the civil service retirement ac-
count, railroad retirement account and the unemployment 
trust fund. 18 As the econ9my continues to grow and unem-
ployment remains relatively low, these funds will continue 
to increase as they have for the past decade.19 This in-
crease mainly reflects the growth of the American economy. 
A shift which is apparent in the remaining ownership 
classes is a substantial decrease in notes and a like increase 
18u. s. Treasury, Annual Report,~ (Washington, 1953), 
p O 597. 











AVERAGE LENGTH OF THE MARKETABLE 
INTEREST-BEARING PUBLIC DEBTl 
Average Length Change In 
Length 
Years Months n:iontbs) 
6 i 5 -11 
5 4 - 4 
5 6 2 
~ 10 4 4 - 6 
1All issues classified to final maturity 
except partially tax-exempt bonds which are class-
ified to earliest call date.~ · 
Source: u. s. Treasury, Treasur~ Bulletin, 
January, 1959, p. 21. 
in certificates •. This does. not necessarily represent a 
preference on their part.· It was probably the result of 
the Treasury's policy of refunding maturing notes into 
27 
.certificates.20 The ·Treasury's opinion, expecially in the. 
first half of this period, was that expansion of plant and 
equipment to meet the defense program and loans to veterans· 
for housing were sufficient to absorb the long-term money 
available. The Treasury felt this opinion was verified by 
the limited response given th_e nonmarketable, long-term 
Investment Series B Bonds. 21 .This aids in explaining the 
decrease in the non,-marketable ·sector as well as the Treas-
ury's preference for short term issues. 
20Ibid .. , p. 83. 
21rbid., p. 199. 
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The remaining significant change was a shift fron non-
bank to commercial bank owners. The exodus of the private 
nonbank investors was attributed by the Treasury to a great-
er supply of higher yielding mortgages and corporate securi-
tieso22 This opinion is substantiated by the Federal Reserve 
which shows insurance companies, one of the major nonbank 
investors, diverting $5.2 billion to corporate securities 
and $2.0 billion to mortgages accompanied by a net decrease 
of $0o2 billion in Federal obligations during calendar year 
1952023 No one specific reason is available to account for 
the commercial banks' increased holdings. However, a few 
plau_sable reasons will be presented. First, there is the 
natural tendency for banks to keep their excess funds in 
short-term securities so they may be liquidated quickly. 
This allows them to make loans with a minimum of delay. 
Secondly, the Treasury was willing to float part of the debt 
by accepting demand deposits at the commerc'ial banks as pay-
ment for the securities, rather than transferring the funds 
to its account at the Federal Reserve. In the latter case, 
the commercial bank must have excess reserves equal to the 
amount of the securities. In the former case they only need 
enough excess reserves to cover the normal requirement for 
demand deposits. Such an operation involving approximately 
22Ibid., pp. 79, 768. 
23Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
nsummary Flow of Funds Accounts," Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
XXXXIII (1957), P• 378. 
one billion dollars occurred in the week ending March 19, 
1952.,24 
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Thus, for the year as a whole, the debt not only be-
came more concentrated in the shorter issues, but~ la:ger 
po~tion was owned by the commercial banking system. Either 
' -
of these trends is · g-enerally considered inflationary.25 
The inflationary bias stems from the following possibilities. 
. -
Short-term debt may be readily converted to cash for spend-
ing on consumption or investment or loans by the commercial 
bankso While, technically, debt creation is deflationary 
since it withdraws money from the economy, i~ becomes infla-
tionary when the government spends the moneyo After the 
money is spent it tends to return to the commercial banks 
in the form of private demand deposits. Not only is the 
money supply enlarged, but the commercial banks have addi-
tional excess reserves for credit expansion. The inflation 
is the result of an increase in the money supply without an 
increase in real output. The probability that the United 
States Government will spend the money it has borrowed may 
also be taken for grantedo 
Indication of inflationary pressure during this period 
may be found in the price indexes as published by the u. $. 
' 
Department of Commerce. The purchaiing power of the dollar 
24P,eder~l Reserve Barut of New York, "Money Market in 
March," Monthly Review, XXXIV (1952), pp. 45-47. 
25National Ci-ty Bank of Ne,w York1 "Treasury Financing," 
Mon~hly Letter, July, 1952, pp. 78-7~. 
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for calendar year 1951, as measured by wholesale, prices and 
consumer prices, fell 5o9 and 602, respectivelyo DU1:9ing th9. 
following calendar year there was a 2o5 rise and a 2.0 fal1.26 
a probable cause· of the 2o5 increase as reflected by wholep 
sale prices is revealed by noting the real changes in gross 
privat~ domestic. investment. This item shows a_cont~n.uous 
downward trend for calendar years 1951 and 19520 Accordin'g-
to the Uo So Department of' Commerce, this decrease in gross 
private investment resulted from a decrease in the rate of 
business inventory accumulation. Other segments, prod11cers 
durables and new ponstruction, remained cQnstant or made 
slight gainso27 This liquidation ~f inventories could be a 
possible cause of lower wholes.ale prices which wo1,1ld · in-
crease the purchasing power of the dollar spent oil whole~ale 
goodso The point here is that the incre~se in the pu:rcha.sing 
ppwer of the wholesale dol~ar during calendar year 1952 may 
not be a valid representati y-e of th~ over-all economy o 
The information above has established·two premi~eso 
,,·,· .. 
First, the debt management was such as to give it a poter;i.-
tial inflationary biaso Second, the American economy suf-
fered some inflation during this fiscal period o However, -
from the point of logic, it may not be conclusively conc~uded 
6 . 
2 Uo So Department of Commerce, i3usiness spatistics 
(Washi~gton, 1957), Po 320 
27u., So Department of Commerce, "National· Income·and 
National Prod1.1ct in 1952," Survey of .Current Business, 
XXXIII (1953), Po 5o 
that the debt management was the sole or partial cause. 
The New York Federal Reserve Bank states that the rise in 
31 
prices could have been due to -·rising costs of product~on, 
increased demand stemming from defense spending, as wel~ as 
the method in which the government deficit was financed. 28 
The cause was possibly a composite of many factors. The 
best conclusion which may be made is that the Treasury's 
debt management so changed the structure of the debt that 
it was capable of being a contributing factor in causing 
inflationo 
Debt Management, 1953 
Fiscal year 1953 marked the first period of debt manage-
ment of a new administrationo The Republican administration, 
which took office during the middle of this fiscal perio~, 
had pledged itself to the task -of stabilizing the dollaro29 
One of the means to this end was a proposed change i~ debt 
management policy. Specifically, placement of the debt in 
long-term issues and reduction of commercial bank holdings 
were cited by Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey as the two 
principal objectiveso30 
2~ederal Reserve Bank of New York, "The Pressure on 
Prices, 11 Monthly Review, XXXIV (1952), pp. 145-1460 
·29National City Bank of New York, "Protecting the Dollar," 
Monthly Letter, December, 1952, p. 1350 
30ue So Treasury, Annual Report, 12.5..3. (Washington, 1954)j 
P• 4o 
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During this fiscal year the total debt increased by 
$7 billiono Examination of Table IV will reveal the compo-
sition of this increase and those changes which warrant 
further explanation. 
The nonmarketable sector remained relatively constant 
with the increase occurring in the marketable securities. 
Within the nonmarketable sector, a significant increase is 
present in special issues, while a similar decrease pre-
vailed in savings notes. Among the marketabl~ se_curities, 
certificates declined sharply with compensating increases 
occurring in the remaining security types, but primarily in 
noteso Of the total absolute change by class of owner, pri-
vate nonbank investors accounted for thirty-seven per cent, 
government investment accounts for twenty-eight per cent, 
Federal Reserve for fifteen per cent, and commercial banks 
for twenty per cent. The latter was the only one reporting 
a net decreaseo Cause and effects of these changes will be 
reviewed in the following paragraphs. 
The increase in special issue.s absorbed by the govern-
ment investment accounts was, as in the previous year, due 
to the growth of these accountso3l The other prominent 
change in the nonmarketable sector was the $2.2 billion d.e-
crease in savings notes. These securities are primarily 
designed to give businessmen. a safe security in which to 
31Ibido, pp. 40, 45. 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL SECURITIESl 
BY TYPE OF ISSUE, FISCAL 1954 
. (In billions of dollars) 
Change accounted for by--











Bills 2.5 2.6 O.l -1.2 1.1 
Certificates -12.6 -3.0 * -2.7 -6.8 
N.otes. . . . 11.5 3.1 * 0.1 8.2 
· · · Bonds: · · · · · · z. 6 3 • 6 o. 4 1 ~ 2 o .1 








0.2 0.2 * 
-2.2 -2.1 * 
2.a --- 2.8 
* -0.l 
-0.8 *' * * 
* -0.1 --- 0.1 
-0.7 
Total * -2.0 2 .. 8~~~~~----- * -o.z 
Total Change .. . . T.O -- -- . . 1+.2~ - 1~2 - -----=2-• .5-- .:i.._.8 
1Gross public debt, and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside the Treasury. 
*Less than $5'0 million• . .. . . . 




place funds being held pending tax paymentse32 During this 
period businessmen tended to favor the increased yield on 
marketable notes and bills as a temporary investment for 
their tax reserves .. Real~zing that a net liquidation was 
occurring in the savings notes, the Treasury replaced the 
existing series A with series Bo This new series yielded 
2o47% as contrasted to 1088% of series A .. However, this 
action was not taken until May 15, 1953, whic,h evidently was 
too late to stem the tide for this period()3 
:, In the marketable sector a shift form- certificates to 
notes is evidento By referring to Table II it may be noted 
that this is the opposite of the change which occurred in 
fiscal year 1952e This was the result of the Treasury offer-
ing higher yielding notes and bonds in exchange for maturing 
certificate$ .. During this period, the Treasury offered.a 
thirty-year, 3 1/4%, bond .. While this bond probably attract-
ed the most attention, the majority of the funding from the 
point of dollar value was ih fourteen month, 2 1/8%, notes 
and seventy-one and one-half month, 2 3/8%, bonds .. 34 
32Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Cash Borrowing of 
the u .. s .. Treasury: Nonmarketable Issues, 11 Mo:qthlz R§ytex, 
JCTXV (1953), Pro 28o ·. 
·' 
33Federal Rerserve Bank of New York, "Treasury Financing 
in Fiscal Year 1953," ~ly Review., XXXV (1953), Po 126., 
34u. Seo Treasury, Annual Repor!, .J..2i3., PPco 32-35., 
35' 
The increase registered by th~ pri"i1ate nonbank sector 
was significant because it represe'nted a reversal of the · 
' 
. trend for the past few years. This increa,se __ wa~ _ ~r:lJ?l~r~lY._ 
due to individuals and state and local governments who made 
·, .. . ··-· -·--.. - ' ' .. . -. -· - . --- ~·. '"' .. 
new purchases of .$1.7 billion each; ,rather thar,i_ -~~~1:>,a~---
fina:hcial institutions.35· This change of preference.may 
have been due to·· improved yields which served to make the 
• i . " •, --- • . --~ •.. .. ·-~ •• • .. .• •. -·-
government securities more competit;ive with private invest-
mento· 
..... 
Contrary to the pattern established by·other owner 
classes, the commercial banks q.ecreased their holdings·of. 
,I -· 
government securities. Where the other owners apparently 
' 
exchanged their maturing certificates for notes, the co~-
mercial banking sys.tam did not. • In :addition, they liqui-
dated part of their bills so that the total decline in these 
two instruments totaled $3.9 billion. A probable cause may 
have been to obtain excess reserves to meet increased demand 
for credit whi'ch was the result of suspension of Regulation 
W by the Federal Reserve on May 7, 1952.36_ The effect of 
the Federal Reserve's action was to remove the down payments 
for home repair and modernization and for all items costing 
less than $100.37 In addition, easier credit and downpayment 
35Ibid., PP• 42-43. 
6 . 
3 Board. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Thirty-ninth Annual Report _(Washington, 1953), p. 82. 
37Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
requirements were provided through suspension. of __ R~~~~~tion 
X on September 12, 1952.38 The Federal Reserve reports that 
short- and intermediate-term borrowing by co:t1~~~r~.i:t1Cl~~s-
ed sharply in _May, 1952, after a relativel;v. ~?nst~~t_):1'.E3~r_.39 
While the above statement did not pertain solely to commer-
cial banks, the Federal Reserve did state in~~~ :t1~:x:~ ~ual 
Report that demand for bank credit underwent considerable 
streng~hening in late 19$2 and early 1953. _ ·The liquidation 
of bills by the commercial banks will be explained in the 
followin~ paragraph. Th~ increase in holding .of bon~~m~y 
reflect, in addition to the improved yield~, the transfer 
of three issues; 2t 1 s of 1959-62, 2t's of 1963-68, and 2t•s 
of 1961+-69, from the bank restricted to the bank eligible 
category.40 
The changes in the Federal Reserve•s port'folio of bills 
.. " - . -·· 
and certificates was likely due to refunding operations de-
scribed .above. The net increase in total holdings may have 
been the-result of implementation of its credit controls. 
For instance, the open market committee resumed p~chas~ng 
of bills in May, 1953, with increased purchases in June_. _ 
' . '·,. l+l 
The pur,pose was to supply reserves to the commercial banks. 
Refe-rence to Table IV will reveal that the net liquidation 
3Sibid., PP• 86-87. 
39roia., P• B. 
l+O - 1 5 u. s. Treasury, Annua Report, 19 3, p~ 32. 
l+lBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve·· System, 
Fortieth Annual Report (Washington, 1951+), p. 5. 
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·. of bills by cormtJ.ercial banks is nearly equal to the 1'1der.~l 
Reserve's. net purcha.seso _ .. _ .. _ 
Duri~g this fiscal year, two principal changes occurred 
in the de~:t:)tructure. The rate of reduction in the-- av9-rage 
length of.t~i debt had beeh. retJ~cied and a ~o;~~~~ J} ~~~ 
•. '·,. ';. 
0
0 ' : -~ ,' , ••• •• ," H • _,, ' 1-r·" , , .. "' o O w .. 
debt had 'li~en shifted from c6mms~cfal banks to privEtte ··non-
• • •• 0• 0 H .... 0 •• •• ~.~ •o 
bank owne~s o These results were· in acco;rdance with ·the . r- .. ·· 
. Treasury's intention, though the '1;-eduction of .. ~ommer~ial-. 
b~nk-held debt may have be.en as mlich a result· ·of Fediral .-. 
Reserve credit policy as Treasury ·debt management o. 
" h 
Tne results discussed above ~ave both inflationaty and 
,, .l 
deflationary potentials. The current deflationary e:f'fect 
of debt creation from nonbank' so-u,rces would be negated by 
the subsequent government spending. Retirement of the com-
mercial bank held debt would be expected to pe inflationary 
-Since the· 1exce,ss · reserves .were probably. used .to expand cred-
it· • ., Thus, every a.iquidated SJecurtty could teelllli~a;ly b:ri?lg 
a ,multiple expansion in the money supply, the m~tiple b~ing 
equal to the -reciprocal of the reserve requirement •. The 
lengthening of the debt would tend to stabilize the debt, 
making rapid expansion of credit by banks ~r_spe!1(1i:r.ig by 
indiViduais ·di;f'ficulto This would tend to prevent infla-
tionary surges in the economy.,.though the effect may be_~ver-
tim'.e, rather than the current period, depending on the length 
of' the debt·o 
_ Another potential deflationary ef'fec.t of .. t;his year I s 
debt.management was its effect on the rate of interesto 
38 
When the Treasury offers to borrow money, this increases the 
demand for money which may cause the price of money, that 
is the rate of interest, to rise. In addition to this di-
rect effect, there may be an indirect effect stemming from 
businessmen's anticipation, and subsequent discounting, of 
the direct effect. A major funding operation by the govern-
ment is of sufficient magnitude to place a heavy, though 
temporary, strain on the money market. Businessmen who are 
anticipating a bond issue of their own will try to enter the 
market at a time when it is not under any abnormal strain. 
This may require them to borrow in advance of their need or 
postpone a bond issue. Similarly, lenders may demand a 
higher rate on the belief that the future interest rate will 
be higher due to an increase in demand resulting from a gov-
ernment funding operation. The result is a process of arbi-
trage which may, indirectly, tend to even out flucuations in 
the price of money. Such an indirect effect was prevalent 
during the latter part of this period, according to the 
Federal Reserve. Businessmen, in an effort to beat the 
Treasury to the market, borrowed in a.dvance of their needs. 
The result was a continued strong demand for money which 
helped create moderate increases in the interest rates during 
the forepart of this fiscal year. After mid-April, 1953, a 
sharp increase occurred with the rate reaching calendar year 
highs in May and June.42 The higher rate of interest could 
l+2Ibid., p. 23. 
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possibly have had a dampening effect on investment spending 
and, if so, a deflationary effect. 
To determine the net effect of preceding possible de-
flationary-inflationary influences is not within the ability 
- -
of this writer. Neither is a positive conclusion available 
by observing the changes in the price level. The purchasing 
power of the wholesale and retail dollars increased 1.4 and 
decreased 0.5, respectively~43 It would appear, however, 
that the variables in the economy, of which debt management 
is one, were such as to retard inflationary pressures. 
Debt Management, 1954 
At the beginning of this fiscal year a truce was estab-
lished in Korea. During this fiscal year the United States 
made a transition from a hot-war economy to a cold-war econo-
my.44 The resulting decline in business activity brought 
changes in Treasury debt management, as _well as Federal Re-
serve monetary policy. As tc;>-- the debt manageme:r:i,t, two prin-
ciple problems claimed the Treasury's attention/ First, the 
Treasury wished to avoid countering the Federal Reserve's 
policy of easing credit. Second, the total debt was approach-
ing the $275 billion limit set by Congress.45 
43u. s. Department of Commerce, Business Statistics, ,.p. 32. 
~ederal Reserve Bank of New York1 .. Treasury Finance in 
Fiscal 1954, 11 Monthly Review, XXXVI (1'354), p. 108. 
45 U.S. Treasury, Annual Report,~ (Washington, 1955), 
pp O 412-413 0 
40 
An examination of Table V will aid in detecting the 
significant changes in the debt structW"e during this peri-. . 
od.r, The debt increased by the amount of $5-.2 billion. 
Except for the special issues sold to the government invest-
ment accounts, the changes were primarily located in the 
marketable sector. The most prominent change among the 
marketable securities was in those of longer terms and was, 
primarily, associated with an increase in commercial bank 
holdings, and a decrease in private nonbank holdings. The 
following paragraphs will be devoted to a discussion of the 
possible causes and effects. 
Government investment accounts increased their purchases 
of special issues by $1.7 billion; however, this was·$1.l 
billion less than the net increase of the previous fiscal 
yearo Examination of data published by the Treasury will 
show that the total receipts of these accounts increased 
' . 
$0 .. 226 billion, but their expenses increased by $1~600 bil-
lion during f·iscal year 1954. The result was a $1.374 net 
decrease in net receipts for this fiscal year. The increase 
in expenses were largely attributable to the federal old-age 
and survivors trust fund and the unemployment trust fund.46 
This increase in expense would appear to be in agreement with 
the recessionary state of ,the economy. 
As stated above, the Federal Reserve was observing a 
policy of easing credit during the fiscal year. This was 
46u. s. Treasury, Annual Report,~, P• 1+47. 
TABLE V 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL SECURITIEsl 
B1 TYPE OF ISSUE, FISCAL 1954 


















Private Government Banks 
non bank investment 
Investors accounts Commercial Federal 
R~_s_erve 
- 0.2 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 
2.6 o.4 * 0.5 1.6 
1.5 1.3 * 1.0 -0. 7 
-0.8 -3.2 0,1 3.7 ... -J.~4 









-0.5 -0.5 --- * 
0,2 Gt2 --- * 
2~ o.5 1-:2 * 
Total Chang.e 5. 2 -1. 7 1. 8 4. 8 0. 3 
1Gross public debt, and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside tpe Treasury. 
*Less than $50 million. 
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i~ne by lowerling ~eserve requir~*ents, lowlt·ing~ --·the_ discount 
jf~te, as we::;1 .. 1 aS;;. performing appfopriate o,/ten m~ket operi-
tions o 47 This fiction by the Feder~l Res~1;ve J~~l~ ~;~v~~ 
.;· ,;_, , .,, .-,. ~- I 
commercial banMs with excess-ieserves which iffi:ey might.other-
wis·e obtain by '·:liquidating goiernment ·s,;~u;;'b~e~ ~ -T~;J ~ay 
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assist in explaining the presEBnce of only a -:·,slight deqreas_e 
in bills as w:ell as the increase in thJ: lon,i~; .;~;~ ~ls-su~~, 
- .. ; ii " .. - --l . 
by the commercial bankse Another fact~r relevant to the 
commercial banks, might be a reluctance on their part to 
! . 
loan to business during a rec_essiono - _Instead, they might 
prefer the sa~ety of government securities for the-ir fundso 
In view of the foregoing conditions, the Treasury de-
signed its debt operations so as to,absorb funds from the 
commercial banks leaving priv·a.te capital for the private 
investment,.needed te provide a higher level 'of economic a'C-
tivity·~48 Furthermore, the debt operations we:re _ d~signed to 
attract the commercial banks O int·ermediate- and long-term 
fundso This was accomplished by offering holders of matur-
ing obl:l,gation·s a_ choice between a one-year or a long-term 
securityo The new money funding also avoided use of' short-
term securitiese49 
The policy and circumstance discussed above may explain 
47:soard of Governors cJf' the Federal Reserve System, 
Forty-first Apnuai·Repor;t (Washington, 1955'), pp. 5-60 
lt-Buo so Treasury~ Aruiual Report, 1954~ p~ 35G 
40-
., J. bid O ' p O 22 0 
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the gains registered by the commercial banks and the losses 
by the private nonbank investors. In addition, they explain 
how the Treasury was able to accomplish the two~month in-
crease in the average length of the debt as exhibited in 
Table III. 
Another consideration of the Treasury was the statutory 
debt limit. During the forepart of this fiscal period, Sec-
retary Humphrey began initiating action to raise the $275 
billion statutory limit.50 The total gross debt subject to 
this limitation, amounted to ~~265.5 billion on June 30, 1953.51 
While this was nearly $10 billion below the maximum, he felt 
' 
action should.be taken immediately because of the Treasury's 
policy of keeping a $6 billion cash operating balance, a 
thirty-day supply, and because it required approximately six-
ty days to prepare for a major funding operation. He felt 
that a temporary extension to $290 billion would provide suf-
ficient margin, though not excessive, and should be allowed 
immediately because of a ~r,5 billion funding operation due in 
September or October.52 Senator Byrd of the Senate Finance 
Committee represented the opposing point of view. His con-
tention was tha~ the debt, of itself 1 was too large at pres-
ent and that a ~$6 billion cash operating balance was more 
5031 U.S. C. A. 757b. 
51u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 1953, p. 382. 
5211Will the Government Run Out of Money?", U. S. News &. 
World Report, August 7, 1953, pp. 31-33. 
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than was actually required.53 Whatever the merit of the 
preceding arguments, the debt limit was not extended during 
this fiscal year. Due to the narrow operating margin, the 
Treasury deemed it ~ecessary to suspend is:sue of savings 
notes. This was done on October 23, 1953.54 This explains 
the small increase in this security despite the improved 
yields tnstituted at the close of the preceding fiscal year. 
For the fiscal year, as a whole, there were two pri-
mary changes, in addition to the net increase, in the com-
position of the debt. A shift of the debt from private non-
.bank investors to the commercial banks and an increase in 
the average length of the debt. The debt creation and sub-
sequent spending could be expected to be inflationary as 
additional money was added to the economy. However, if the 
·v 
spending served to employ idle resourc.es, then the addition 
to national product would offset the increase in the -money 
supply and tend to dampen the inflationary pressures. The 
creation of debt from the banking system might be deflation-
ary if it wer~ short 6f excess reserves. In view of the 
Federal Reserve•s monetary policy, it would appear likely 
that the copunercial banks had sufficient excess reserves. 
Specifically, the exces~ reserves of Federal Reserve member 
banks exceeded their borrowings by the beginning of fiscal 
5 3" Sena. tor Byrd Warns U. S ~ : Debt is Too · Big ·Already,'.! 
u. s. News and World Report, August 21, 1953, pp. 37-39. 
54u. S. Treasury, Annual Report, 12.2'.!±, p. 201·. 
45 
19540 The margin of excess reserves over borrowings contin-
ued to increase throughout this fiscal yearo55 The liquida-
tion of debt held by investors in the nonbank sector would 
provide these persons with funds for private investmento 
-
The imrestment spending, if it occurred, would be similar to 
government spending; th.a.t is, the economic effect would de-
pend on whether unemployed resources were activatedo 
In addition to the effects of investment and government 
spending considered above, consideration may be given to 
changes in the various interest rateso Assuming no increase 
in the supply of money, debt creation might be expected to 
raise the interest rate since the demand for money would be 
increasedo The assumption that the money supply did not 
increase must not be lightly madeo The Federal ReserveRs 
easy money policy would tend to add to the money supply. 
Even with a constant supply of money, a fall in income would 
decrease transactions demand which would make more money 
available for lending and investmento A survey of the mar-
ket interest rate shows a decline during this periodo The 
monthly average yields on corporate bonds fell from 3a61$ 
for June, 1953, to 3ol6% for June, 1954. 'Similarly, yields 
on Treasury 'bonds fell from 3o09% to 2a54% for the same peri-
od<»56 The average hank rate on business loans for nineteen 
55Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Fort2-first Annual, Report, PP0 27-290 
56u .. So Department of Commerce, J3usiness Statistics, 
p .. 980 
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selected cities fell from 3.73% in June, 1953, to 3.60% in 
June, 1954.57 From the above reasoning and data, a hypoth-
esis that the debt management did not deter the monetary 
policy seems evident. 
Inflationary-deflationary forces, as expressed by the 
price indexes, seem to have been self-compensating with the 
inflationary pressure slightly the stronger. The purchasing 
power of the consumer's and wholesaler's dollar fell o.4 
each for the fiscal year.58 While this may not correspond 
with a recessionary economy, it may be remembered that the 
economy was commencing the recovery phase around the end of 
this fiscal year. 
The net effect of the debt management is difficult to 
isolate due to other economic influences. These influences 
include the active participation of the Federal Reserve plus 
the slump and then recovery in economic activity. To make 
the convenient assumption of "ceteris paribus" in this case 
seems too unrealistic. However, some appraisal of the 
Treasury's objectives may be made. The Treasury desired to 
lengthen the maturity of the debt; this was accomplished. 
The Treasury wished to avoid interfering with the Federal 
Reserve's monetary policy. In view of the economic recovery 
which was in progress at the end of this fiscal period, the 
least that may be said is that debt management did not prove 
too great a handicap to monetary policy if it did not help it. 
57Ibid., p. 82. 
5Bibid., p. 32. 
Debt Management, 1955 
The Treasury's twin debt management goals of lengthen-
ing the debt and inducing economic growth, contributing to 
neither inflation nor deflation, were reaffirmed by Secre-
tary Humphrey before the Congressional Subcommittee on 
Economic Stabilization.59 Other administrative decisions 
concerning the debt and its management pertained to the 
debt limit and the limitation on purchase of bonds by the 
commercial banks. At the beginning of this period the 
total debt, s.ubject to the statutory limitation, stood at 
$270.8 billion, though it had come within $0.3 billion of 
the $275 billion limit during fiscal 1954.60 On August 
24, 1954, Congress approved a temporary increase of $6 
billion to expire on June 30, 1955.6l However, on June 30, 
1955, Congress extended the increase for another year.62 
In regard to the bank restricted bonds, on January 1, 1955, 
all Treasury bonds were declared elgible for purchase by 
commer cial banks.63 
The total federal debt increased, as recorded in Table 
VI, by the amount of $3.1 billion during fiscal year 1955. 
59 Annual Re12ort, 122.2 (Washington, 1956), U. s. Treasury, 
pp . 290-291. 
6ou. s. Treasury, Annual Re12ort, 1.22'.i, pp. 412-413. 
6168 Stat • 895. 
. 6269 Stat. 241. 
63u. s. Treasury, Annual Re12ort, 122.2, PP• 186, 515-516. 
TABLE VI 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL SECURITIES1 
BY TYPE OF ISSUE, FISCAL 1955 







Nonmarketable, etc •. : 
Savings Bonds 
Savings Notes 





(In billions of dollars) 
Total -
Changes 










~ 3.0 * -1.5 -1.4 
-4.6 -2.3 * -3.9 1.7 
8.8 5.7 0.1 4.4 -1.4 
0,6 -0.2 0.2 1.0 -0.3 





-3.1 * * 1.0 
* 
* 
-0.2 -0.2 * * 
0.3 0.3 * * 
-1.7 -2.7 1.0 * 
Total Changes 3,1 3,4 1,2 -0,1 -1.4 
lGross public debt, and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside the Treasury. 
*Less than $50 million 
~ource: u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, .1222 (Washington, 1956), p. 34. 
+ co 
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Marketable securities accounted for most of the net increase 
in the total debt as well as the net decrease registered by 
some of the nonmarketable issues. The significant changes 
in the nonmarketable sector consist of any increase in spe-
cial issues and a decrease in the savings notes. In the 
marketable sector there was a definite decline in the hold-
ings of certificates and a larger increase in notes by all 
owner classes except the Federal Reserve. As to the total 
holdings of the four classes of owners, private nonbank in-
vestors and government investment accounts enlarged their 
portfolios while the banking system liquidated a part of 
theirs. The following paragraphs will discuss the probable 
causes and effects of the changes just cited. 
While government investment accounts enlarged their 
holdings, the net increase was $0.7 billion less than in 
fiscal year 1954. By comparing Tables IV, v, and VI it may 
be seen that this was the second year for this downward 
trend. However, the c,aus€ was similar to that of the pre-
vious fiscal period. It was due to smaller purchases by the 
federal old-age and survivors insurance trust fund and the 
unemployment trust fund.64 The net liquidation of savings 
notes were due to the suspension of their issue in the pre-
ceding fiscal year. Consequently, this does not represent 
a change of preference on the part of the investors. On 
64Ibid., p. 33. 
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June 30, 1955, there was $1.9 billion in savings notes out-
standing.65 
The liquidation of certificates and gains in notes re-
flects the continuation of the Treasury's policy of offering 
holders of maturing securities a choice between two securi-
ties of one-year terms or more. This policy was -used in 
four of the five major refundings. In the issues for cash, 
all securities had terms in excess of one-year except for 
one tax anticipation certificate. The purpose of this poli-
cy is ·to lengthen the average maturity of the debt.66 The 
bonds issued during _this ·period, and as exhibited by the 
increase in Table VI, were of intermediate terms. An excep-
tion was a 3%, forty-year, bond issued in February. It was 
the first bid for long-term money since fiscal 1953, and the 
longest since the Panama Canal bonds of 1911. However, its 
relat ive significance was not too great because it only 
amounted to less than $2 billion.67 The effect of this 
emphasis on long-term se·curi ties was to increase the average 
length of the debt by four months, as exhibited in Table III. 
A ~ause for the liquidation of bills by the banking 
system and an almost equal gain by the nonbank investors may 
be found by observing the Federal Reserve 1s credit policy. 
In Febru~ry, 1955, the Federal Reserve changed its policy 
65Ibid., pp. 26-27~ 
66 Ibid • , p • 2 5 • 
67Ibid. 
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f,rom. one J:t e~edi t ease to one of credit restraint~· Thus, 
',•. 
: ' 
t~.e 1;quidJtion m~y repres~nt open market ~ales d~et'igned to 
' • • ·t}·, -· .'.':\ ,·\ \ ."\', '\ ' 
withdraw money from the economy and raise the rate, of. ".inter-
.. \ ' 
esto In a period of dwindling reserves and increased ·ct-edit 
. de~ano., the commercial banks could be expected to rtp1en1sh 
th~ir re~erves by selling government bills.68 The in~r~a~ed 
' ) 
yields on the bi:J.ls would serve as an inducement to the non-
1 
bank investo~s t:t place the:tr funds ;in tqese securities• 
• .I i:; . 
The effect of debt creation in fiscal 19;; would be 
4argely confine~ to the private nonbank investorso One$ 
I 
again it may be{ said tp.at while creation' of debt would tend 
. . I ~ , 
to 'be.deflationary, the S'lilbsequent spending would tend to 
offset it. Some WTiterE( ha~e sp~eul~ted t'hat the marginal 
propensit~, to consume of·the recipients c5f tpe idvernnient 
/ . , ,'. -· ,· . . . ,: . . I '. . . . . . t, . 
spend1nw- might be -higher than that of ~h' lenders, thus re-
. i/ .: ~ .. , · : - , : .: . . . . I • 
sulting' in a net irtfla.'tionary effect'. The increase in the 
I ' • • 
. . -· 
length of the debt and 'the shift to longer t~rm miturities; 
would tend to·· stabilize the debt· and possibly give r-ise to 
d·eflationary pressures. The 1:t:quidation of government securi-
ties by the commercial banks for the pu:r:pose of meeting 
credit demands by business would generally be considered 
·expansionary. However, if' the liquidatiQn tC!> provide re-
' - ' ,' t I 
quired reserves:.was !t;;he result of increases in the reserve 
• I • J 
. r..eqµ:\re~ef'r~ ~ th.tr:"$ woµld be no i~la ttOnjiry effec;,~ ~ . m'h. 
' i 
possibility ~f the latter1, ·at least to some degree, is 
68:soard.of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
.Forty~second Annual Report (Washington, 1956) ,· P• ;. · 
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reasonable considering the tight money policy. The addition-
al supply of securities during this period of credit restraint 
could be expected to increase the interest rate. Interest 
rates did increase' during the latter part of this period. 
However, to attribute the rise in interest rates and subse~ 
quent deflationary effect to Treasury debt management would 
necessitate ignoring the Federal Reserve. It seems reason-
able to conclude that the Treasury debt management, at least 
in the last half of the fiscal year, facilitated the Federal 
Reserve's effort to dampen inflationary pressure. 
Debt Management, 1956 
Fiscal year 1956 was marked with a rarity in the records 
of debt management. The total gross public debt and guaran-
teed obligations decreased during this period. This was the 
first decline since 1951 and only the fourth since World War 
Two.69 
As to borrowing operations, the Treasury managed to 
limit its major operations to four trips to the market; August 
December, March, and June. This may be compared with as many 
as twelve in some post-World War Two years.70 While fewer 
trips to the market reduces the Treasury's overhead costs, 
the main advantage is to the Federal Reserve which has more 
free time to implement its monetary policy. 
69 · u. s. Treasury, Annual Report,~ (Washington, 1957), 
p. 3930 
70ibid., pp. 23, 27. 
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While not a major operation, the .. Treasury did reopen 
the books on the three percent, forty-year, bonds orginally 
issued in February, 1955. The second offering was made in 
·'I July, being delayed till this time pending renewal of the 
extension of the debt limit by Congress on June 30, 1955. 
This cash issue, in the amount of $0.821 billion, was the 
only long-term issue of this fiscal period.71 The average 
length of the debt fell from five years and ten months to 
five years and four months, as exhibited in Table III. This 
loss of six months was equal to the sum of the gain in each 
of the two previous fiscal years. The emphasis on shorter 
term securities was the result of the Federal Reserve's de-
cision to change its credit policy from one of credit ease 
to one of credit restraint, thus cuting the supply of long-
term money. 72 The change of credit policy occ.urred in Feb-
ruary, 1955, and continued throughout this calendar year. 73 
The same general policy remained in effect during the calen-
dar year 1956. 74 
Examination of Table VII shows that the decrease in total 
debt amounted tg $1.6 b:j) .. lion. This decrease was, primarily, 
in the nonmarketable sector. The marketable sector remained 
7libid., p. 26. 
72 b. 23 24 I id., pp. · - ·• 
73Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Forty-second Annual Report, pp. 5-8. 
74 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Forty-third Annual Report (Washington, 1957), p. 13. 
TABLE VII 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP OF FEDERAL SECURITIESl 
BY TY:PE_9F ISSTJE, F~SCAL 1956 
(In billions of dollars) 
Changes accounted for by--
Government 
Banks 





investment Commercial Federal 
accounts Reserve 
Marketable: 
Bills 1~3 1.5 0.2 -o.4 
Certificates 2~5 -0.1 0.3 -0.5 
Notes -4.8 1 .. 0 o.6 -3.8 
* 2.7 
-2.5 
Bonds o,8 2.0 * -1.3 
Total -0.2 4.4 1.2 -5.9 0.2 
Nonmarketable, etc.: 
Savings Bonds -0.9 --0. 5 * -o.4 Savings Notes -1.9 -1.9 * * Special Issues 1.-9 1.9 
Investment Series , 
Bonds -o.6 -0.5 -0.1 * 
Othe~ 0.1 0.2 -- -0.l 
Total -1.1+~~-. -2.6 1.8 -0.5' --
Total Change. . :.r:o---~~-~~-:C.8 . 3.C> - --- -~-· -6.5 0.2 
lGross public debt, and guaranteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside the Treasury. 
*Less than $50 million. 
Source: u. s. Treasury, Annual ReEort, 1956 (Washington, 1957), p. 34. 
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relatively constant, as a whole, though it did contain a 
marked shift from commercial hanks to private nonbank inves-
tors. 
There were two significant changes in the nonmarketable 
sector. First, the government investment accounts increased 
their holdings of special issues. It may be noted that the 
trend of successively smaller net increases qf the past two 
fiscal years was reversed. The net increase of special is-
sues for this fiscal year exceeded the net increase for fis-
cal 1955 by $0.9 billion. This was the result of an improved 
receipts-exp:endi tures relationship in the federal old-age and 
survivors trust fund and the unemployment trust fund which 
allowed these funds to increase their investments~75 This 
probably reflects the continued recovery from the recession. 
Second, the nonbank investors show a decrease of $1.9 billion 
in their holdings of savings notes. Actually, this does not 
represent a preference on their part. It is the result of 
the Treasury's decision in a previous period to suspend issue 
of these securities. All outstanding savings notes matured 
during this fiscal year. 76 ,,_ 
The principal change in the marketable sector was the 
shift from commercial banks to nonbank investors. This shift 
may have been due to the following facto!s• As stated above, 
the Federal Reserve was observing a policy of ._credit re-
straint. As the economy continued its recovery from the 
75u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, l.2.22, P• 34. 
76 
Ibid., p. 431. 
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recession? businessmen increased their demand for credito77 
As a result of these two factors, the commercial banks liq-
uidated government securities to increase their supply of 
~, .. . bl ·"und '?S Th 1' . d t' f . t. b . 1 J .. oana. e. :r.: · s~ e .iqui a 1.on o securi ies y commercia 
·,. \. 
banks could be expected to increase the supply of these securi-
ties .. , The increased supply would tend to lower the selling 
price of the securities which would increase the yieldG This 
tendency for higher yields would be augmented by the Federal 
Reserve 1 s credit policyo As the preceding premises suggest, 
interest rates did rise throughout fiscal 1956e79 Theim-
proved yields would serve as incentive for nonbank investors 
to purchase the government securities as witnessed by Table 
VIIo At this point the question may arise·as to who was 
demanding credit from the commercial banks if nonbank inves-
tors had funds to place in government securitieso Further 
analysis of the changes within the nonbank classification 
will resolve this contradictiono During this period insur-
ance companies, mutual savings banks, and nonfinaneial cor-
porations did register a net decrease in their holdings of 
government seeuritieso However, net purchases by individ-
uals, state and local governments, and miscellaneous inves-
tors were sufficient to create the net increaseo80 
77Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Annual Report - 1.222 
(New York, 1957)~ PPo 23-246 
78 . · Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Forty..,thi.!:g Annual ,Be;gort, p,, 80 
79Ibido, PPc 11-136 
80 
U$ So Treasury, Annual Report,~' Po 310 
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This was a fiscal period in which the Treasury allegedly 
had to make a choice between its two primary objectives. Ac-
cording to Secretary Humphrey, the Treasury sacrificed length-
ening the debt in favor of economic growth and stability so 
as not to counter the Federal Reserve's policy of credit re-
straint, thus serving to stabilize the dollar.Bl Statisti-
cal data does not verify the success of the Treasury's action. 
The purchasing power of the wholesale and consumer dollars 
fell 2.8 and 1.7, respectively.82 Either one should be 
sufficient evidence of inflationary pressure. 
A more critical review of the Treasury's action will 
shed some light on probable causes of this inflationary 
tendency. As noted above, the debt was reduced by ~Ja.6 bil-
lion. Liquidation of the debt, considered by itself, is 
inflationary since it adds to the money supply without in-
creasing real goods and services. It may be said to the 
Treasury's credit that it did concentrate the liquidation in 
commercial bank held debt. Such debt is generally less infla-
tionary than liquidation of nonbank held debt because it does 
not immediately add to the money supply. However, if the 
commercial banks utilize their new excess reserves for loans, 
the approximate degree of inflation will be the same in ei-
ther case, ''ceteris paribus. 11 Since this was a period of 
tight money and growing demand for loanable funds, one would 
81 4 Ibid., pp. 23-2, 233. 
82u. s. Department of Commerce, Business Statistics, p. 32. 
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expect that commercial banks would utilize their excess re-
serves. This expectation may be confirmed by observing the 
statistical data published by the Federal Reserve. The excess 
reserves of all commercial banks who were members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System presented a downward trend throughout 
fiscal 1956. A similar trend is displayed by these bank's 
free reserves, excess reserves less borrowings, which were 
negative during this fiscal year, except for the month of 
July, 1955.83 The point which is to be made here, is that 
due to monetary policy and expanding business conditions it 
is probable that liquidation of commercial bank held debt 
was as inflationary as liquidation of debt held by nonbank 
owners. 
In the Treasury's favor it must be conceded that limit-
ing its major operations to four trips would facilitate exer-
tion of monetary policy. In addition the Treasury can not 
be blamed for not issuing more long-term debt if the market 
would not absorb it. The shift from commercial banks to 
private nonbank investors may have been unavoidable due to 
the priority extended to monetary controls. However, it 
appears that when the Treasury realized its receipts would 
exceed expenditure it would have held the excess as an idle 
budget surplus. 
The general conclusion in regard to this fiscal year 
is that while inflation can not be proven to be due to debt 
83 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
Federal Reserve Bulletin, XXXXII (1956), p. 945. 
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management, the latter was probably endowed with a potential 
inflationary bias. Instead of the Treasury sacrificing one 
objective for the other, it seems that both may have been 
sacrificed by liquidation of the debt. 
Concluding Comments 
The preceding has presented an account of changes in 
debt structure as resulting from the Treasury's effort to 
manage the debt during fiscal 1952 through 1956. To this 
was added the possible and probable causes and economic 
effects of the debt management. In the following chapter 
a summary will be provided giving an over-all review of the 
information presented in this chapter. Conclusions which 
are deemed pertinent will be presented. 
CHAPTER IV 
FIVE YEARS OF DEBT MANAGEMENT 
Summary 
The preeeding chapter has presented a detailed analysis 
of debt management during five periods. Where chapter three 
considered the economic causes and implications peculiar to 
a given period, this chapter will employ a similar approach 
treating the several periods as a unit. The purpose of this 
aggregate view is to facilitate recognition of major trends 
in the composition of the debt. 
Before trends may be determined, irrelevant and con-
flicting data must be eliminated. Table VIII is provided to 
aid in this analysis. 
During fiscal 1952 private nonbank investors were at-
tracted by higher yielding mortgages and veterans' loans. At 
the same time commercial banks were induced to purchase govern-
ment securities by the Treasury's willingness to float part 
of the debt. The result was a net liquidation by private 
nonbank investors and a net increase on the part of commer-
cial banks. The following year the private nonbank investors 
increased their holdings while commercial banks registered a 
net redemption. Individuals and state and local governments, 
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TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATED CHANGES IN FEDERAL DEBT1 , FISCAL 1952 THROUGH 1956 
(In billions of dollars) 
Net Changes per Fiscal Year 
Five Year Net 
Change 
Per 
1952 1953 1954 195'5 1956 Amount Cent 
Type of SeGurity: 
Marketable: 
Bilis - - - , 3.6 2.5 -0.2 * 1.3 7.2 41 
Certificates 18.9 -12.5 2.6 -4.6 2.5 6.8 39 
fuotes -16,8 11,5 1.5 8.8 -4.8 Q.2 Ol 
Bonds ____ -~ ___ -3.2 5,6 -o.8 0,6 o.8 2.9 16 
Total 2.5 6,9 3,0 -----i+,8 -0,2 12,1 92 
Nonniar¥=etable, etc.: · 
Savings Bond~ 0.1 
Savings :Notes --1.2 

















·- Bonds - -0.5 -o.8 -0.5 -0.2 -o.6 -2.5 
Other ____ ~~_ -0.1 * 0.2 0.3 __Q__._l__~- ----~_3 
T_otal 1.4-- * - ------2.~2- -1-:-7----------::r.1+-==- o .4- -
Class of Investor: 
Private Nonbank -2.2 4.2 -1.7 3.4 1.8 5.6 
Government Invest-
ment Accounts 3.4 3.2 1.8 1.2 3.0 12.5 
Commercial Banks 2.8 -2.3 4.8 -0.1 -6.5 -1.3 











-- Total _Change_ _ _ __ 3_.9 ____ 7_. 0 .__2 _____ _3_., 1 _____ , -1. 17__._ --------- _100 
°" I-' 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
lGross public debt, and guarGnteed obligations of the Federal Government 
held outside the Treasury. 
2This total is equal to the sum of Total Marketable Securities plus 
Total Non.marketable, etc. Securities or to the sum of the four investor 
classes. 
*Less than $'50 million. 
Source: u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 
394-395. 
U.S. Treasury, Anu,ual Report, 
u. s. Treasury, Annual Report, 
J..ill. (Washington, 1957), pp. 31, 
~ (Washington, 1955), pp. 36. 
~ (Washington, 1953), p. 79. 
°' I\.) 
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who may have been attracted by the improved yields and to 
whom safety is more important, accounted for the increase in 
the private nonbank sector. Increased credit demands stern-
ing from suspension of regulations Wand X by the Federal 
Reserve were a likely cause for the commercial banks' deser-
tion of government securities. The following fiscal year 
was characterized by a recessionary economy. The Treasury 
funded the debt from commercial banks who were operating 
under a liberal credit policy, in order to leave private 
funds for private investment. As a result the debt structure 
shifted back to commercial banks. As the economy began to 
emerge from the recession in fiscal 1955, nonbank investors 
began to purchase government securities. The Federal Re-
serve's switch to a tight money policy in February, 1955, 
and credit demands by the expanding economy stemmed the pur-
chase of government securities by commercial banks. Actually, 
the commercial banks registered only a slight net liquidation, 
but the private nonbank investors absorbed the debt's in-
crease. Thus the struetu:t'e of the debt was beginning to 
gravitate back towards nonbank ownership. This movement be-
came very prominent in fiscal 1956. In response to the tight 
money policy, com.merical banks registered a large net liqui-
dation in their government portfolios. The shift to nonbank 
investors was more the result of the commercial banks' liq-
uidation than the small net purchase by the private nonbank 
investors. Thus for the five years, the debt made four 
shifts between the two classes of private ownership. 
Though the sum of the absolute change between the com-
mercial banks and the private nonbank investors amounted to 
:~28 .. 9 billion, the net change was only ~:~6 .. 9 billion. Eval-
uation of the significance of this change must be oriented 
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to the two political administrations which were in charge of 
debt management during the five-year period .. · The shift to 
commercial banks during fiscal 1952 was consistent with the 
policy of the-Democratic administration .. This administration 
favored funding the debt in short-term securities. Commer-
cial banks prefer to place their funds in short term securi-
ties so that the funds are readily available for commercial 
loans. On the other hand, the Republican administration had 
stated that it intended to avoid concentration of the debt 
in the commercial banks., 'tfuile the net change for the five-
year period does show a shift away from the commercial banks, 
this shift was not the result of a consistent trend. To 
conclude that the· Treasury accomplished its goal does not 
seem warranted sinc·e the /[p6 .. 9 billion shift to private non-
bank investors is really the result of a fortunate choi'ce 
of a date for terminating this study. If the study had been 
terminated at another point the net shift would have probably 
been different .. The pertinent point is that the shift-of 
debt between these two ownership cl~sses is more a matter of 
monetary policy and exogenous economic forces than of Treasury 
direction. 
A similar CY:clical action is displayed by the average 
length of the interest-bearing marketable debt. During the 
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post accord and prerecession periods, the length of the debt 
fell continuously,, Approximately three-quarters of this 
0 
twenty-four month period was during the Democratic::.a.dmini:str,a-
( 
tion, an administration whose debt management policy empha-
sized use of short-term securities. The Republican adminis-
tration took office during the latter part of this period. 
Their policy of lengthening the debt may be the cause of 
only a four month decline in the length of the debt during 
fiscal 1953 as compared with eleven months in the previous 
fiscal year. However, the effect of the debt lengthening 
policy seems to be apparent in the next two years during which 
the debt increased two and four months, respectively. This 
was accomplished by offering holders of maturing securities 
a choice between a one-year or a longer term security. In 
addition a forty-year bond was issued during fiscal 1955. 
The gains in the debt's length were of short life'. At the 
beginning of fiscal 1956 the Treasury reopened the books on 
the forty-year bonds, but received very little response. 
The Federal Reserve had switched to a tight money policy in 
February. Between the tight monetary policy and the expand-
ing economy, the Treasury found it necessary to rely oncer-
tificates and bills for debt refundtng. As a result the· 
average length fell six months, an amount equal to the sum 
of the gains over the last two years. During the entire five 
years, the debt's length reversed its direction twice, going 
through three phases of a cycle. 
As in the previous case of commercial bank and private 
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nonbank owDership, evaluation of changes in the debt's length 
must give consideration to the political administrations. 
The decrease in the length of the debt during the forepart 
of this period was, as explained above, consistent with the 
policy of the Democratic administration .. The attempt of the 
Republican administration to lengthen the debt was not very 
successful, as a whole. It may be that its policy of foster-
ing economic growth was not consistent with its policy of 
lengthening the debt .. During recessionary periods, such as 
fiscal 1951+, the Treasury was able to utilize intermediate-
term securities" This was probably d-qe to liberal monetary 
policy which may be expected to prevail at such times. But 
during periods of extensive economic activity, such as fiscal 
1956, there tends to be sufficient private investment oppor-
tm1ity to absorb most of the intermediate- and long-term 
money., Consequently, the Treasury must deal in maturities 
which are not conducive to lengthening the debt. The crux of 
this discussion is that the Treasury may be its own victim. 
If its fiscal policy is successful in promoting a high level 
of economic activity, its debt management policy of length-
ening the debt may be. unsuccessful. 
There are at least two trends which are not attributable 
to debt management. The .most obvious is the growth of the, 
debt, itself,. Except for a small amount of capitalized 
interest, this is entirely exogenous to the Treasury's man-
agement of the debt .. A more subtle one is the role played 
by the government investment accounts,. These accounts 
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absorbed nearly three-quarters of the net increase in the 
debt. However, the Investments Branch of the Bureau of Ac-
counts is required by law to invest the surpluses of these 
accounts in government seeurities.1 The Treasury provides 
special issues for this purpose. Therefore, the signifi-
cance of these accounts is not as an effect ''of" debt man-
agement, but only their effect "on" debt management. That 
is, if these accounts did not purchase this debt, the Treas-
ury would have to sell it to private investors. 
Throughout this five-year period there has been a tend-
ency for the debt to shift from the nonmarketable to the 
marketable sector. Analysis of this trend will necessitate 
examination of each sector, individually. 
First, consideration will be given to the investment 
series bonds. This classification consists of two series, 
both initially issued prior to the beginning of the period 
being studied in this report. The books on the series B 
· were opened for a second time during the forepart of fiscal 
1952, but the bonds were not well received by investors. The 
reason given by the Treasurer was that plant and equipment 
spending induced by government defense spending and veterans' 
loans absorbed nearly all the long-term money. The Treasury 
has not offered these bonds since this time, consequently 
they have presented a continuous downward trend. The other 
1u. s. Treasury, Annual RQport, 1256 (Washington, 1957), 
p. 102. 
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nonmarketable security which has shown a continuous decline 
is the savings notes. This is due to their discontinuance 
in October, 1953. At this time the Treasury felt that such 
a volatile security was not consistent with the narrow mar-
gin between the size debt and the debt limit. 
Observation of the marketable sector for the five-year 
period ·will show that eighty per cent of the increase was 
absorbed by short-term bills and certificates. Only a neg-
ligible one per cent may be assigned to notes and sixteen 
per cent to bonds. However, it is impossible to detect such 
a trend in the annual data. Closer investigation will reveal 
that a very defined shift of this nature is true of fiscal 
1952. Not only was this type of a shift a characteristic of 
fiscal 1952, but it was of such magnitude that it biases the 
aggregate net figures. It is the proposition of this writer 
that fiscal 1952 is not consistent with the remaining four 
years and must be ignored when trying to determine overall 
trend. To aid in this revised approach, Table IX is provided 
which corrects the net changes to a four-year base. The re-
vised figures do not necessitate any changes in previous con-
clusions about changes in the debt structure. Although, it 
does remove some of the emphasis which may be given to the 
special issues and government investment accounts. However, 
a marked change is apparent in the marketable sector. While 
bills and bonds still represent significant amotu1ts of the 
increase there has been a substantial sh.tft from certificates 
to notes. This is consistent with the Treasury's policy of 
TABLE IX 
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refunding the debt into intermediate-term securities. Since 
these intermediate-term securities generally carried terms 
of less than five years, this is not inconsistent with the 
decline of the debt's length to a point of five years and 
four months. 
Any analysis of a shift between the marketable and non-
marketable sectors must consider the particular securities 
involved. For instance, a reduction in savings bonds with 
a compensating increase in marketable securities would add 
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an element of stability to the debt. Savings bonds may be 
converted to cash on the demand of the holder while market-
able securities must be held, by one investor or another, 
till maturity. A shift from special issues to marketable 
securities might add instability to the debt. The government 
investment accounts may be counted on to hold their surplus 
funds in government securities, but private investors may 
decide to transfer his·funds to private investment when the 
security maturies. The savings note could be used for pay-
ment of taxes two months after issue and redeemed for cash 
four months after issue. Either of these options could be 
exercised at the holder's discretion and without notice to 
the Treasury. These securities matured in two years. The 
investment series B bonds could be converted to a five-year 
marketable note providing the investor gave two months notice. 
The time between the holder's decision to convert and the 
actual conversion could range from two to eight months de-
pending on the time of year in which notice was given. Both 
of these series were long-term bonds. Therefore, it does not 
seem likely that there was much change in stability of the 
debt as a result of this shift, though a slight amount may 
have been gained by the shift from savings notes to the mar-
ketable securities. This shift seems to be the product of 
legislative limitations on the Treasury's duty to manage the 
debt and to be without any particular economic significance. 
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Conclusion 
The general conclusion of this study is that Treasury 
debt management is not as much a matter of discretion as 
would be supposed. A few examples will serve to illustrate 
this point. The Republican administration sought to shift 
the debt from commercial banks to private nonbank investors. 
The achievement of this goal is highly doubtful and any prog-
.ress was probably as much the result of Federal Reserve mone-
tary policy as the result of pure debt management strategy .• 
Efforts to lengthen the debt encountered similar circu.mstances. 
In fact, it was proposed that such a policy might not be 
consistent with economic growth. The shift of the debt to 
the marketable sector was the result of a Treasury decision 
which was necessitated by a debt limit set by Congress. 
While the Treasurers have never failed to publish debt 
management policies, these policies are of a very general 
nature, e.g. --- to promote full employment, to encourage 
economic activity. This suggests a lack of spec.if'ic debt 
management policy which would use the debt as an economic 
tool. An example which supports this suggestion is the debt 
1iquidation during fiscal 1956. This was during a time when 
Federal Reserve was trying to implement a tight money policy. 
It would appear that even when the Treasury finds :I. ts elf in 
a position to use its discretion, it reacts like a privat~ 
debtor rather than a pubiic servant. 2 Such action leaves 
2A private debtor could be expected to give preference 
to his personal welfare even though such action might cause 
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doubt as t~ whether additional power to manage the debt, such 
as no debt limit, would actually produce better debt man~ge-
ment. 
The specific conclusion of this study may be briefly 
' 
stated. 1) The primary consideration of the Treasury is to 
obtain sufficient funds to meet Congressional appropriations. 
2) The secondary concern is to avoid adverse influence on 
Federal Reserve monetary policy. 3) .After accomplishing 
these two objectives there seems to be little room for dis-
cretionary debt management. 4) Even when circumstances are 
i 
such as to minimize the attention which must be given to the 
first two objectives, the Treasury's management of the debt 
may not be based on sound economic principles. 
inflation. However, a government should consider the effect, 
of its financial activity on the whole economy. 
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